USA v. Michael Marcavage by unknown
2010 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-16-2010 
USA v. Michael Marcavage 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Michael Marcavage" (2010). 2010 Decisions. 1064. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/1064 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 09-3573
            
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MICHAEL ANTHONY MARCAVAGE,
                              Appellant
            
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-08-mj-00511-001)
District Judge:  Honorable Legrome D. Davis
            
Argued April 13, 2010
Before:  FISHER, HARDIMAN and
COWEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 16, 2010)
C. Scott Shields (Argued)
Shields & Hoppe
223 North Monroe Street, Suite 305
2P.O. Box 23
Media, PA  19063
Counsel for Appellant
Richard W. Goldberg (Argued)
Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA  19106
Counsel for Appellee
Edward Diver
John J. Grogan
Langer, Grogan & Diver
1717 Arch Street
Suite 4130, The Bell Atlantic Tower
Philadelphia, PA  19103
            
OPINION OF THE COURT
            
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Michael Anthony Marcavage led an anti-abortion
demonstration on a sidewalk in front of the Liberty Bell Center
in Independence National Historical Park in Philadelphia.  When
park rangers ordered him to move to a nearby location away
from the sidewalk and granted him a verbal permit to
demonstrate there, Marcavage refused until he was forcibly
Because Marcavage appeals his conviction, we must1
view the facts in a light most favorable to the government.
United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 989 n.4 (3d Cir.
1980).
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removed.  He was cited for violating the terms of a permit and
interfering with agency function.  A Magistrate Judge convicted
him of both offenses and rejected his First Amendment defense,
a ruling upheld by the District Court.  We conclude that
Marcavage’s permit violation must be vacated because the
verbal permit he was issued was invalid and that his interference
conviction must be vacated because it was obtained in violation
of his First Amendment right to free speech.
I.
Independence National Historical Park (“Park”), located
in downtown Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is a national park
administered by the National Park Service, a division of the
Department of the Interior.   It is home to Independence Hall1
and the Liberty Bell, among other sites and objects of historical
interest.  The Liberty Bell is located within a block of the Park
bounded by Market Street to the north, Chestnut Street to the
south, 6th Street to the west, and 5th Street to the east.  The
building housing the Liberty Bell, the Liberty Bell Center, is
located in the southwest corner of the block, abutting 6th and
Chestnut Streets.  The 6th Street sidewalk, like those running
along 5th, Market and Chestnut Streets, is partially made of
Belgian block on the portion directly adjacent to the street, while
its remaining surface area is covered with slate.  The area of the
46th Street sidewalk bordering the Liberty Bell Center is partially
lined with chained metal bollards along its curb.  Market and
Chestnut Streets are also rimmed with bollards.
Demonstrations of varying size take place in the Park
each year.  In 2007, for instance, 175 permits were issued for
demonstrations collectively involving more than 100,000
people.  The messages of the groups leading these
demonstrations run the gamut; they include immigration policy,
gay rights, and Tibet’s political status, to name just a few
examples.  The Code of Federal Regulations outlines a process
for obtaining a permit to demonstrate in national parks,
including Independence National Historical Park.  See 36 C.F.R.
§ 2.51(a).  A prospective demonstrator must submit to the Park
superintendent an application containing basic information
about the nature of the proposed demonstration, id. § 2.51(b),
and the regulations require the superintendent to issue the permit
while making exceptions for events that, among other things,
threaten public health or safety or impair the Park’s “atmosphere
of peace and tranquillity,” id. § 2.51(c).
On October 6, 2007, Marcavage headed an approximately
twenty-person-strong anti-abortion demonstration along the
sidewalks surrounding the Park.  His group had neither applied
for nor obtained a permit to demonstrate in the Park.
Construction around the block of the Park in which the Liberty
Bell Center is located left the entrance and exit opening onto the
6th Street sidewalk as the only means of accessing the Center on
the day of Marcavage’s demonstration.  Marcavage and some
other members of his group positioned themselves on the
sidewalk’s Belgian block outside the 6th Street entrance to the
5Liberty Bell Center, while some of their co-demonstrators were
stationed at different spots along that sidewalk and nearby
sidewalks.  Several members of the group displayed signs
depicting aborted fetuses and other anti-abortion-related images.
Although Marcavage was not holding a sign, he both spoke with
and preached to passers-by and people waiting in line to enter
the Liberty Bell Center, for a while with the aid of a bullhorn.
At approximately 11:45 a.m., Alan Saperstein, a National
Park Service ranger employed at the Park, approached
Marcavage, informed him that he could not demonstrate directly
outside the Center’s entrance and exit, and told him to move to
an area near the Independence Visitor Center on Market Street
and not to use his bullhorn in front of the Liberty Bell Center.
Marcavage and his group stayed put.  At around 12:10 p.m.,
Saperstein again told Marcavage to move his demonstration to
Market Street and to stop using the bullhorn in front of the
Liberty Bell Center.  Marcavage again refused to comply.  At
approximately 12:40 p.m., Saperstein approached Marcavage
and put him in contact by cellular telephone with Ian Crane,
Saperstein’s supervisor and the Park’s chief ranger.  Crane, who
had dealt with Marcavage during past demonstrations in the
Park, asked Marcavage to obey Saperstein’s order and
encouraged him to move to a different location.  Marcavage
refused and stayed on the 6th Street sidewalk.  At approximately
1:10 p.m., Saperstein again approached Marcavage and
explained that he needed a permit to hold his demonstration.
Saperstein then granted Marcavage a verbal permit, authorizing
the demonstration to take place in a grassy area on the opposite
side of the Liberty Bell Center – an area the Park had apparently
designated for demonstrations – and Marcavage to use his
The Magistrate Judge had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.2
§ 3401, the District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231 and 18 U.S.C. § 3402, and we have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.  See United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 162
(3d Cir. 1997).
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bullhorn at that location.  Marcavage did not relocate.  At 1:46
p.m., Saperstein again ordered Marcavage to move to that
location and Marcavage again refused.  At approximately
2:05 p.m., Saperstein, by now accompanied by a few other
rangers, again tried to speak with Marcavage and ordered him
to move, but Marcavage again refused to comply.  Saperstein
and a fellow ranger then physically restrained Marcavage by
holding his hands behind his back and marched him off the 6th
Street sidewalk and through the gate leading to the Liberty Bell
Center.  There, Marcavage was cited for violating the terms of
a permit under 36 C.F.R. § 1.6(g)(2).  Several months later,
Marcavage was mailed a second citation for interfering with
agency function in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 2.32.  Both citations
are misdemeanors.
Following a two-day bench trial, a Magistrate Judge in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found Marcavage guilty of
both offenses, rejected his First Amendment defense, and
sentenced him to twelve months’ probation.  The District Court
affirmed.  Marcavage has timely appealed his conviction, raising
both sufficiency-of-the-evidence and First Amendment
challenges.2
II.
7In determining whether a defendant is entitled to a
judgment of acquittal, “[w]e must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the . . . verdict and presume that the [finder of
fact] properly evaluated credibility of the witnesses, found the
facts, and drew rational inferences.”  United States v.
Wasserson, 418 F.3d 225, 237 (3d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).  “The verdict . . . must be sustained if
there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to
the [g]overnment, to support it.”  Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted).  Legal determinations are given plenary
review, United States v. Ledesma-Cuesta, 347 F.3d 527, 530 (3d
Cir. 2003), while factual findings must be upheld unless clearly
erroneous, United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 237 (3d Cir.
2000).
We exercise plenary review over the legal question
whether a defendant’s First Amendment rights have been
violated.  See United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 553 (3d
Cir. 1991).  While we review a district court’s factual findings
“with substantial deference, reversing only for clear error,”
United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1357 (3d Cir. 1994)
(citation omitted), in the First Amendment context we have an
“obligation independently to examine the whole record to ensure
that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on
the field of free expression,” United States v. Scarfo, 263 F.3d
80, 91 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
III.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
8Marcavage was convicted of two crimes.  One of those
crimes was violating the terms of the verbal permit Ranger
Saperstein granted him.  The applicable regulation, 36 C.F.R.
§ 1.6(g)(2), prohibits “[v]iolating a term or condition of a permit
issued pursuant to this section.”  Throughout these proceedings,
the parties have disputed the validity of the verbal permit issued
to Marcavage, Marcavage urging that a permit must be in
writing and the government insisting that there is no such
requirement.  Neither side has referenced any legal authority to
support its position.  Both the Magistrate Judge and the District
Court agreed with the government, reasoning that nothing in the
governing regulations affirmatively imposes a writing
requirement.
At oral argument, we referred the government to 36
C.F.R. § 1.4(a), which neither party had cited in either the
District Court or this Court.  Section 1.4(a) defines a “permit,”
for purposes of § 1.6(g)(2) and related provisions, as “a written
authorization to engage in uses or activities that are otherwise
prohibited, restricted, or regulated.”  36 C.F.R. § 1.4(a)
(emphasis added).  The government indicated that it was
unaware of § 1.4(a) or its effect on § 1.6(g)(2) and asked for an
opportunity to review it.  After oral argument, the government
submitted a letter pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 28(j) and now “recognizes that the permit issue here
does not meet the definition provided in Section 1.4.”
(Appellee’s Rule 28(j) letter, Apr. 19, 2010.)  That recognition
notwithstanding, the government rather curiously does not
concede that Marcavage’s § 1.6(g)(2) conviction must fall,
asserting instead that Marcavage was “not prejudiced by the
absence of a written document[.]”  (Id.)
The two relevant provisions of 36 C.F.R. § 2.32 read as3
follows:
(a) The following are prohibited:
(1) Interference.  Threatening, resisting,
intimidating, or intentionally interfering with a
government employee or agent engaged in an
9
We know of no authority that relieves the government of
its burden of proving every element of a crime if the defendant
cannot show post-conviction that he was “prejudiced” by the
government’s failure to do so.  The plain language of § 1.4(a)
speaks unequivocally:  a permit must be in writing.  Cf. Kleissler
v. United States Forest Serv., 183 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 1999)
(applying unambiguous regulation’s plain language).  Because
the government’s apparent reading of § 1.4(a) is both plainly
erroneous and inconsistent with that regulation, we give it no
weight.  See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504,
512 (1994).  If the government is looking for prejudice, it need
look no further than its having sought and obtained Marcavage’s
conviction on a fatally flawed legal premise.  Because
Marcavage’s permit was not in writing, it was not valid.  Hence,
his § 1.6(g)(2) conviction cannot stand and, as such, it will be
vacated.
Marcavage was also convicted of interfering with agency
function under 36 C.F.R. § 2.32, which sets forth several ways
a person may be guilty of “interference.”  Marcavage was found
guilty of committing interference in two such ways.   We need3
official duty, or on account of the performance of
an official duty.
(2) Lawful order.  Violating the lawful order of a
government employee or agent authorized to
maintain order and control public access and
movement during fire fighting operations, search
and rescue operations, wildlife management
operations involving animals that pose a threat to
public safety, law enforcement actions, and
emergency operations that involve a threat to
public safety or park resources, or other activities
where the control of public movement and
activities is necessary to maintain order and
public safety.
Throughout this opinion, we interchangeably use4
variants of the words “restriction,” “regulation,” and
“exclusion” to refer to the government’s actions vis-à-vis
10
not be detained long in concluding that the government
presented sufficient evidence for the Magistrate Judge to have
reasonably found that Marcavage “resist[ed] . . . or intentionally
interfer[ed] with” the rangers in the course of their official
duties, see 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1), one of the ways Marcavage
was found to have committed “interference.”  That conclusion,
however, does not immunize the government’s case against
Marcavage’s First Amendment challenge, for if we conclude
that Marcavage’s First Amendment rights were violated because
of the restrictions  placed on his speech, his § 2.32 conviction4
Marcavage’s speech.  The government disputes the
characterization that Marcavage was excluded from the 6th
Street sidewalk, but the record leaves no doubt that the rangers
repeatedly ordered him to move his demonstration to either
Market Street or what the rangers described as a “free speech
area” on the other side of the Liberty Bell Center.  When
Marcavage refused, he was forcibly removed from the sidewalk.
This dispute, in any event, boils down to a semantic cavil that
does not affect the disposition of this case.
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perforce fails.  See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218
(3d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (vacating criminal conviction on First
Amendment grounds), aff’d on other grounds, 559 U. S. ___,
130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).  With that in mind, we now turn our
attention to Marcavage’s First Amendment challenge.
B. The Nature of Marcavage’s First Amendment
Challenge
At the outset of our analysis we must frame the precise
issue before us, as Marcavage does not clearly specify whether
he is mounting a facial or an as-applied constitutional attack,
and the Magistrate Judge and the District Court did not
explicitly clarify the lens through which they viewed that attack.
A facial attack tests a law’s constitutionality based on its text
alone and does not consider the facts or circumstances of a
particular case.  See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g
Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770 n.11 (1988).  An as-applied attack, in
contrast, does not contend that a law is unconstitutional as
written but that its application to a particular person under
Not all of the Justices agree on the first formulation of5
a facial attack, see Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449 (noting
12
particular circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional
right.  See, e.g., Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410,
411-12 (2006) (per curiam).  A criminal defendant may seek to
vacate his conviction by demonstrating a law’s facial or as-
applied unconstitutionality.  See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); United States v. Eichman,
496 U.S. 310 (1990); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98
(1940).  In response to our inquiry at oral argument,
Marcavage’s counsel asserted that his client’s challenge was a
hybrid of the two.  There is certainly nothing impermissible
about arguing in the alternative, see Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U. S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 876, 892 (2010), but insofar as
Marcavage’s challenge is facial his burden is significantly
heavier, see Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569, 580 (1998), and we may dispatch it briefly.
There are two main ways to succeed on a facial challenge
in the First Amendment context.  A plaintiff may demonstrate
either “‘that no set of circumstances exists under which the
[law] would be valid,’ i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all
of its applications,” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (quoting United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)), or that the law is
“overbroad because a substantial number of its applications are
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the [law’s] plainly
legitimate sweep,” id. at 449 n.6 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).   Marcavage cannot meet either test, as he has5
that “some Members of the Court have criticized the Salerno
formulation”), but it retains vitality in this circuit, see, e.g.,
Khouzam v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 549 F.3d 235,
258 (3d Cir. 2008).
Insofar as Marcavage may have attacked the Park’s6
permitting scheme on either facial or as-applied grounds, that
challenge is no longer before us, as we have already concluded
that Marcavage’s conviction for violating the terms of a permit
must be vacated on other grounds.
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not even tried to convince us that the regulation criminalizing
interference with agency function is unconstitutional for all
purposes and all applications or that it is overbroad.  See id. at
449 n.6; United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir.
1986).6
Although his position may want for clarity, Marcavage’s
chief complaint, as we understand it, is that the government
squelched his speech on a particular day and in a particular place
because he was talking about abortion, and that the government
had no warrant to do so under the circumstances.  While a
sprinkling of the cases on which he relies involve facial attacks,
the outcome Marcavage advocates is for all intents and purposes
entirely dependent on the facts of this case, and he nowhere
even obliquely suggests that the constitutionality of the
regulation at issue should be assessed against a broader
backdrop.  That is a classic as-applied challenge.  See Wash.
State Grange, 552 U.S. at 444; Members of City Council of L.A.
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 802-03 (1984).
Marcavage’s effort to vacate his conviction on First7
Amendment grounds is supported by the American Civil
Liberties Union of Pennsylvania as amicus curiae.  Amicus has
taken no position on whether there is sufficient evidence to
sustain Marcavage’s conviction.
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Accordingly, we may train our sights on the question whether
the government’s regulation of Marcavage’s speech was
constitutional in this particular case.7
C. Forum Analysis
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the
right of the people to peacefully assemble.”  U.S. Const. amend
I.  The degree of First Amendment protection a speaker enjoys
depends on the type of forum in which his expressive activity
occurred.  McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 652 (3d Cir.
2009).  The Supreme Court has identified three different types
of fora:  “the traditional public forum, the public forum created
by government designation, and the nonpublic forum.”  Ark.
Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).  “Traditional public fora
are defined by the objective characteristics of the property, such
as whether, by long tradition or by government fiat, the property
has been devoted to assembly and debate.”  Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).  “Designated public fora,
in contrast, are created by purposeful governmental action.”  Id.
The third category, nonpublic fora, includes all remaining
To the extent Marcavage and amicus suggest that the 6th8
Street sidewalk was somehow converted into a designated
public forum merely by its heavy pedestrian traffic, we are
unpersuaded, as there must be an affirmative governmental
intent to create such a forum, and there is no evidence here of
any such intent.  See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720,
730 (1990) (plurality opinion); Bjerke, 796 F.2d at 649-50; see
also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. N.J. Sports
& Exposition Auth., 691 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[A]
place owned or controlled by the government does not become
a public forum simply because members of the public are freely
permitted to visit it.”).
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government property.  Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992).
The Magistrate Judge determined that the 6th Street
sidewalk is a nonpublic forum largely because the Park
superintendent designated it as a “restricted” area and opened it
up to the public for the sole purpose of providing access to the
Liberty Bell Center.  The District Court agreed with that
determination for largely the same reasons, though the District
Court added that the sidewalk’s physical characteristics – in
particular, its chain-linked bollards and Belgian block – as well
as the presence of human congestion, made it a nonpublic
forum.  Neither of the parties here describes the 6th Street
sidewalk as a designated public forum, so we will limit our
analysis to the other two categories.   Hoping for the greatest8
amount of protection, Marcavage argues that the sidewalk is a
16
public forum.  The government, in turn seeking to lower its
burden, asks us to find that the sidewalk is a nonpublic forum.
It is well established that traditional public fora include
sidewalks, streets, and parks that the public has historically used
for assembly and general communication.  See Hill v. Colorado,
530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480-
81 (1988); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).  This Court, in fact, has specifically
remarked that “the streets and sidewalks of Philadelphia[] [are]
an undisputed quintessential public forum.”  Startzell v. City of
Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 196 (3d Cir. 2008).  Notwithstanding a
sidewalk’s presumptive status as a public forum, “the First
Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply
because it is owned or controlled by the government.”  U.S.
Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S.
114, 129 (1981).  In other words, not all public sidewalks
constitute public fora for First Amendment purposes.  McTernan
v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 527 (3d Cir. 2009).  The question
whether a particular sidewalk is a public or a nonpublic forum
is highly fact-specific and no one factor is dispositive.  See, e.g.,
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727-29 (plurality opinion); Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 805
(1985); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1983).
A court must consider the forum’s physical traits as well as its
past uses and purposes.  See, e.g., Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727-29
(plurality opinion); Grace, 461 U.S. at 179-80; Hague v. Comm.
for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
In determining whether a sidewalk is a public or
nonpublic forum, its physical appearance is one factor to be
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considered.  In United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, the
Supreme Court held that a public sidewalk directly next to the
Supreme Court building was a public forum even though it was
included in a statutory definition of Court property.  Noting that
the sidewalk was not visually distinguishable from others to
which it was connected or in close proximity, the Supreme
Court explained that “[t]here is no separation, no fence, and no
indication whatever to persons stepping from the street to the
curb and sidewalks that serve as the perimeter of the Court
grounds that they have entered some special type of enclave.”
Id. at 180.  Since Grace, the Supreme Court has taught that
“separation from acknowledged public areas may serve to
indicate that the separated property is a special enclave, subject
to greater restriction.”  Lee, 505 U.S. at 680 (citing Grace, 461
U.S. at 179-80).
Here, the 6th Street sidewalk is largely indistinguishable
to the naked eye from the sidewalks nearby.  It is true that,
unlike the sidewalk on the other side of 6th Street and those on
the other sides of Market and Chestnut Streets, respectively, the
6th Street sidewalk is made, at least in part, of Belgian block.
But, as noted, so are the Chestnut and Market Street sidewalks
lining the Park.  And we are aware of no authority suggesting
that a unique construction material underfoot, without more,
would necessarily put an individual on notice that he was
suddenly treading on a different sort of government property
where expressive activity was disallowed.  In fact, courts have
concluded quite to the contrary.  See, e.g., ACLU of Nev. v. City
of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003) (sidewalk
was public despite decorative pavement); Venetian Casino
Resort v. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas, 257 F.3d 937,
18
945 (9th Cir. 2001) (different paving and landscaping did not
transform a public sidewalk); Gerritsen v. City of Los Angeles,
994 F.2d 570, 576 (9th Cir. 1993) (blue lines on a sidewalk
insufficient to distinguish it from a public park).  The 6th Street
sidewalk is also bordered by chain-linked metal bollards, but
here again, so are the Chestnut and Market Street sidewalks to
which the 6th Street sidewalk is physically joined.  See Venetian
Casino Resort, 257 F.3d at 945 (noting absence of “barriers or
other physical boundaries to indicate to . . . pedestrians . . . that
the sidewalk . . . enjoys a different legal status than the public
sidewalks to which it is seamlessly connected”).
Together, the Belgian block and bollards arguably lend
some support, however minor, to the government’s position that
the 6th Street sidewalk is a nonpublic forum.  In the end, though,
we think these distinctions immaterial, as there is little else
distinguishing the 6th Street sidewalk from any of the sidewalks
to which it is actually connected.  See Lee, 505 U.S. at 680;
Venetian Casino Resort, 257 F.3d at 947-48 (holding that a
privately-owned sidewalk that was “connected to and virtually
indistinguishable from the public sidewalks to its north and
south” was “the archetype of a traditional public forum”
(quotation marks and citation omitted)); Freedom From Religion
Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 494-95 (7th
Cir. 2000) (property was public where it was “not physically
differentiated from the surrounding public park, and no visual
boundaries . . . would inform the reasonable but
unknowledgeable observer that the . . . property should be
distinguished from the public park”); Henderson v. Lujan, 964
F.2d 1179, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (sidewalks near Vietnam
Veterans Memorial wall were public due, in part, to their
19
“apparent similarity to ones of the classic variety”).  And at any
rate, even assuming these physical characteristics sufficed to put
an individual on notice that he was entering “some special type
of enclave,” Grace, 461 U.S. at 180 – a highly dubious
proposition under the circumstances – “[t]he mere physical
characteristics of the property cannot dictate forum analysis,”
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727 (plurality opinion).
Even if the 6th Street sidewalk’s physical appearance
does not weigh decisively in one direction or the other, its
historical uses practically cement its public forum status.
Traditional public fora are “places which by long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.”
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.  As noted, sidewalks presumptively fit
that description, Hill, 530 U.S. at 715, and the 6th Street
sidewalk is no exception.  The record does not reflect that it has
ever been a place free of “public assembly and debate.”  See
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988).  On the very day of
Marcavage’s demonstration, in fact, there was a breast cancer
awareness march proceeding along the Park’s edge, including on
the 6th Street sidewalk.  Members of the public are permitted to
freely travel along the sidewalk in either direction, take a break
and stand for a moment, or use it to go to any destination they
please, and all this without obtaining a permit or otherwise
seeking permission.  Like the sidewalks abutting 5th, Market
and Chestnut Streets, it is open to walkers, joggers, cyclists, and
skateboarders; there are no time restrictions on when people
may use any of those sidewalks; and there are no signs anywhere
indicating that those sidewalks are closed off to expressive
activity.  See Lederman v. United States, 291 F.3d 36, 43 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (sidewalk next to the Capitol Grounds in Washington,
20
D.C., was a public forum where it was frequented by “tourists,
joggers, dogs, and strollers”); Henderson, 964 F.2d at 1182
(sidewalks near memorial were public where they were “used
for the full gamut of urban walking” and were “used by
thousands of pedestrians every year, including not only
Memorial visitors but also people going to other places”).  The
6th Street sidewalk’s widespread use as a common thoroughfare
strongly supports a finding that it is a public forum.  See City of
Las Vegas, 333 F.3d at 1101 (“[W]hen a property is used for
open public access or as a public thoroughfare, we need not
expressly consider the compatibility of expressive activity
because these uses are inherently compatible with such activity.”
(citation omitted)); First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1128 (10th Cir. 2002)
(similar); Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186, 189-90 (4th
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (similar); cf. Del Gallo v. Parent, 557 F.3d
58, 72 (1st Cir. 2009); Bjerke, 796 F.2d at 649.
For similar reasons, the 6th Street sidewalk’s purposes
likewise connote its status as a traditional public forum.  True,
the sidewalk permits the sole way into and out of the Liberty
Bell Center, or at least it did on the day of Marcavage’s
demonstration.  But, as noted, it is also a largely unrestricted,
common thoroughfare, accessible to pedestrians walking in
either direction to destinations other than the Liberty Bell.
These circumstances sharply distinguish the 6th Street sidewalk
from sidewalks and streets that are separate from the common
thoroughfare and are designed exclusively to permit access to a
particular building or area.  See, e.g., Kokinda, 497 U.S. at
727-28 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he postal sidewalk was
constructed solely to provide for the passage of individuals
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engaged in postal business . . . [and] not to facilitate the daily
commerce and life of the neighborhood or city.”); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976) (sidewalks on a military
base were nonpublic); McTernan, 577 F.3d at 527-28 (ramp
parallel to a public sidewalk leading to a Planned Parenthood
facility was nonpublic because its only purpose was to allow
access to the facility); Bjerke, 796 F.2d at 649 (walkway was
nonpublic where it served only to provide post office access).
Unlike the sidewalks discussed in such cases, the 6th Street
sidewalk is more fairly described as “a necessary conduit in the
daily affairs of the locality’s citizens,” or “a place where people
may enjoy the open air or the company of friends and neighbors
in a relaxed environment.”  Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981).
Finally, we note that there is no evidence in the record
that the 6th Street sidewalk or its environment bears any special
characteristics suggesting anything other than a public forum.
Cf. Greer, 424 U.S. at 838 (military installation was not a public
forum because its business was to train solders, not to serve as
a place for expressive activity); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (noting “the special
characteristics of the school environment”).  In light of all these
circumstances, we hold that the 6th Street sidewalk, “[a]s a
‘thoroughfare sidewalk,’ seamlessly connected to public
sidewalks at either end and intended for general public use,”
We are unswayed by the government’s several9
arguments to the contrary.  To be sure, the government has
proffered evidence that the Park published an advertisement
after September 11, 2001, announcing new security measures,
including the requirement that visitors to the Liberty Bell Center
show identification upon entry.  The government also spotlights
the Park’s regulation omitting the 6th Street sidewalk from a list
of approved locations for demonstrations.  But to the extent the
government contends that the 6th Street sidewalk is a nonpublic
forum simply because the Park had jurisdiction over it and the
authority and discretion to issue permits, the government misses
the mark, as “[t]he issuance of a permit to use [a] public forum
does not transform its status as a public forum.”  Startzell, 533
F.3d at 196 (citations omitted).
We are no more convinced by the government’s position
that the National Park Service effectively converted the 6th
Street sidewalk into a nonpublic forum for a limited time due to
ongoing construction that restricted ingress into and egress out
of the Liberty Bell Center, as the government “may not by its
own ipse dixit destroy the public forum status of streets and
parks which have historically been public forums.”  Grace, 461
U.S. at 180 (internal quotation marks, alteration and citation
omitted); see Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678 (“[T]raditional public fora
are open for expressive activity regardless of the government’s
intent.” (emphasis added)).  To change a property’s public
forum status, the government “must alter the objective physical
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Venetian Casino Resort, 257 F.3d at 948 (quoting Frisby, 487
U.S. at 480), is a traditional public forum.9
character or uses of the property . . . .”  Lee, 505 U.S. at 700
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).  We have been
shown no indication that the government did so here.  For that
very reason, the government’s own evidence that the south side
of Chestnut Street, between 5th and 6th Streets, has been
entirely closed off to the public, actually undermines, rather than
bolsters, its position, as the 6th Street sidewalk inarguably has
not been closed off.
The government’s apparent argument that the 6th Street
sidewalk is a nonpublic forum because it is part of the Park is
likewise unpersuasive, as the government has not even
attempted to establish that the Park itself is not a public forum.
Cf. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. ___, 129 S. Ct.
1125, 1129 (2009) (“[A] park is a traditional public forum for
speeches and other transitory expressive acts.”); Student
Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. Bd. of Sch.
Dirs., 776 F.2d 431, 435 (3d Cir. 1985) (parks are “paradigmatic
examples” of public fora).  Indeed, the National Park Service’s
own description of the Park would critically enfeeble any such
argument.  See National Park Service, Independence National
H i s t o r i c a l  P a r k ,  H i s t o r y  &  C u l t u r e ,
http://www.nps.gov/inde/historyculture/index.htm (last visited
June 14, 2010).  Similarly, the government’s own evidence
would undercut that argument.  The preface to the regulations
governing demonstrations in the Park states that “[t]he Bill of
Rights was adopted in 1791 in what is now Independence
National Historical Park; therefore, the [P]ark has a singular
association with the rights of assembly and free speech.”  (Supp.
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App. 23 (emphasis added).)
Finally, the government’s reliance on United States v.
Goldin, 311 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2002), is misplaced.  There, the
parties did not dispute that the interior of the Liberty Bell Center
was a limited public forum, so we took them at their word and
did not independently analyze its status.  We strongly doubt, in
any event, that the interior of the Liberty Bell Center would
qualify as a traditional public forum in the way a sidewalk does.
The Magistrate Judge alternatively found the10
government’s restrictions on Marcavage’s speech constitutional
under an intermediate standard of scrutiny even if the 6th Street
sidewalk were classified as a public forum, a finding with which
the District Court agreed.  Significantly, that finding was based
in part on the conclusion that those restrictions were content-
neutral.  As we will explain, we part company with the District
Court on that conclusion and thus disagree with this alternative
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D. Speech Restrictions in a Traditional Public Forum
Because the Magistrate Judge and the District Court
wrongly concluded that the 6th Street sidewalk was a nonpublic
forum, their principal analyses subjected the government’s
restrictions on Marcavage’s speech to an improperly low
constitutional bar.  The constitutionality of those restrictions
instead must be measured against a more exacting set of
benchmarks.10
holding.
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In a traditional public forum, “the rights of the state to
limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”  Perry, 460
U.S. at 45.  To determine whether speech restrictions in such a
forum are constitutional, we apply the time, place, and manner
doctrine.  Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 271 (3d
Cir. 2009).  Under that doctrine, “the government may regulate
the time, place, and manner of . . . expressive activity, so long as
such restrictions are content neutral, are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample
alternatives for communication.”  Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S.
191, 197 (1992) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
However, if speech restrictions in a public forum are
content-based, we test their constitutionality by asking whether
they were necessary to serve a compelling government interest,
were narrowly drawn to achieve that interest, and were the least
restrictive means of achieving that interest.  See Perry, 460 U.S.
at 45.  The burden is on the government to justify a restriction
on speech.  See Startzell, 533 F.3d at 201; N.J. Citizen Action v.
Edison Twp., 797 F.2d 1250, 1255 (3d Cir. 1986).
The first element of the test asks whether the restrictions
on Marcavage’s speech were content-neutral or content-based.
“As a general matter, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”  Ashcroft
v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).  Content-neutral restrictions are those
“that are justified without reference to the content of the
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regulated speech.”  City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475
U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (internal quotation marks, emphasis and
citations omitted).  Content-based restrictions, in contrast,
encompass restrictions not only on “particular viewpoints” but
also “an entire topic.”  Consol. Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980).  “To determine if a
restriction is content neutral, ‘the principal inquiry in speech
cases . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”
Startzell, 533 F.3d at 197 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (other alterations omitted).
“It is the government’s purpose that controls.”  Id. (citation
omitted).  To find that that purpose is content-based,
“[s]omething must point decisively to a motivation based on the
subject matter, or content, of the speaker’s message . . . .”
McTernan, 564 F.3d at 653.  “Deciding whether a particular
regulation is content-based or content-neutral is not always a
simple task.”  Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642
(1994).
As he did before both the Magistrate Judge and the
District Court, Marcavage asks us to infer that his speech was
suppressed because of its content based primarily on:  (1) the
presence of a large number of carriage drivers as well as other
pedestrians, including breast cancer awareness marchers who
were proceeding along the 6th Street sidewalk at the same time
as his demonstration but were not told to move to a different
location; and (2) the Park rangers’ testimony that they both
observed and were concerned that those pedestrians as well as
Liberty Bell visitors were disturbed by Marcavage’s anti-
Marcavage also intimates that his speech was regulated11
not only because of its content but because of his viewpoint.
We acknowledge that homing in on the difference between
viewpoint discrimination and content discrimination is
sometimes difficult.  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-31 (1995).  In this case,
however, the distinction is crystal-clear.  The government
engages in viewpoint-based discrimination when it “attempts to
differentiate between divergent views on a singular subject” or
“pick[s] and choose[s] among similarly situated speakers in
order to advance or suppress a particular ideology or outlook.”
McCullen v. Coakley, 571 F.3d 167, 175 (1st Cir. 2009)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).  There is no claim here,
nor is there any hint in the record, that the rangers exhibited a
preference for a different abortion message than the one
Marcavage espouses.  Rather, if anything, the rangers tried to
stamp out any abortion-related communication.
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abortion message.   The Magistrate Judge acknowledged the11
testimony bearing on these points but found that the marchers,
like other pedestrians using the sidewalk, were in constant
motion and therefore were not obstructing traffic flow while, he
noted, Marcavage and his group were stationary.  Without
explicitly addressing the rangers’ testimony about their
perception of the reaction to Marcavage’s message, the
Magistrate Judge found “no credible evidence that [Marcavage]
was asked to move his protest due to the content of his
message.”  (J.A. I 30.)  The District Court, seeing no clear error
in the Magistrate Judge’s findings, likewise rejected
Marcavage’s claim in this vein.
It bears mentioning that the Magistrate Judge did not12
specifically find that Marcavage actually created a choke point,
but rather that Marcavage “was told that his protest activities
was [sic] creating a choke point on the sidewalk that interfered
with the flow of visitors into the Liberty Bell Center.”  (J.A. I 30
(emphasis added).)  That finding perhaps could have been
expressed more articulately, but under the circumstances we
believe it to be tantamount to a finding that there was in fact a
choke point.
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Although the Magistrate Judge did not say so explicitly,
in finding that Marcavage’s removal was content-neutral he
evidently credited the rangers’ testimony that their motivation
for removing Marcavage was based exclusively on their concern
for public safety and their observation that Marcavage’s
activities were creating a choke point.   The Magistrate Judge12
made that finding without explaining how it squared with the
rangers’ other testimony highlighting their concerns about the
reaction of other individuals to Marcavage’s speech or with
photographic and video evidence painting a decidedly different
picture from the one the rangers described.  By the same token,
although not stated in as many words in his opinion, the
Magistrate Judge apparently discounted Marcavage’s testimony
that his removal was a result of the reaction of other individuals
as well as his argument that the rangers regulated the speech of
no one else on the 6th Street sidewalk.  In other words, although
the Magistrate Judge did not directly resolve any conflicts in the
trial testimony and evidence and did not make any express
credibility determinations, we think it plain enough that his
content-neutrality finding derived from his conclusion that the
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rangers were credible and that Marcavage was not, at least on
this central point of contention.
We ordinarily defer to a trial court’s factual findings,
particularly when they are predicated on credibility
determinations.  See United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 464
(3d Cir. 2003); see also, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d
139, 149-50 (3d Cir. 2002).  We adhere to that default rule,
however, only where the trial court’s “decision is based on
testimony that is coherent and plausible, not internally
inconsistent and not contradicted by external evidence[.]”
United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1997).  As
the Supreme Court has explained, a
trial judge may [not] insulate his findings from
review by denominating them credibility
determinations, for factors other than demeanor
and inflection go into the decision whether or not
to believe a witness.  Documents or objective
evidence may contradict the witness’ story; or the
story itself may be so internally inconsistent or
implausible on its face that a reasonable factfinder
would not credit it.  Where such factors are
present, the court of appeals may well find clear
error even in a finding purportedly based on a
credibility determination.
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985)
(citation omitted).
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In our view, the factors the Anderson Court described are
attendant here.  There are simply too many inconsistencies and
gaps in the testimony of the government’s witnesses, not to
mention substantial contradictions between that testimony and
other evidence in the record, for us to accept the finding that
Marcavage’s removal was not motivated by the content of his
speech.  Because “deference to the trier of fact . . . is the rule,
not the exception,” id. at 575, we will lay out the reasoning
behind our conclusion in some detail.
Ranger Saperstein testified that he heard complaints
about Marcavage’s demonstration “[f]rom visitors, from the
horse carriage drivers, and from other employees.”  (J.A. II 58.)
When Marcavage asked Saperstein what the problem was with
demonstrating on the sidewalk, Saperstein told Marcavage that
the reason he had to move was that he was not giving others the
option of not seeing his signs.  Saperstein also testified that the
complaints he received were tied directly to the “the signs and
the messages depicted” and that “[p]eople were upset that they
were there . . . .”  (J.A. II 67.)  Saperstein acknowledged that he
told Marcavage that he could not stand near the Liberty Bell
Center’s entrance or exit “because he wasn’t giving . . . the
visitors . . . the option of not seeing [his] signs,” and because
“they [had] no choice but to be hit with [his] message.”  (J.A. II
68.)  When asked whether one of his concerns was that
Marcavage was not giving people the option of not seeing his
signs, Saperstein responded, “Yeah, that was one of the – one of
the concerns.”  (J.A. II 69.)
Chief Ranger Crane also testified that he was concerned
about the impact of Marcavage’s message on Liberty Bell
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visitors.  Crane stated that he said the following to Marcavage
over the telephone:  “I said to him, you know, Michael, it’s kind
of unfair.  You are at an advantage of speaking, you know, to a
group that can’t leave.  Those individuals are there to see the
Liberty Bell and if they want to see the Liberty Bell, they have
to listen to your message.”  (J.A. II 170.)  Later on, Crane
attempted to clarify those remarks.  He testified that he “did not
have a concern of whether those individuals cared to hear his
message or not.  What I believe that I was trying to impress on
Mr. Marcavage was that there were plenty of areas that he could
go to and speak his message . . . where people could choose or
choose not to go.”  (J.A. II 197.)  Crane reiterated that stance at
various points during his testimony.
Nan Byrne, another ranger working at the Liberty Bell
Center on the day of Marcavage’s demonstration, echoed
Saperstein’s and Crane’s testimony about the concern that
Liberty Bell Center visitors were constrained to listen to
Marcavage’s message and Saperstein’s observation of those
visitors’ reactions to Marcavage’s message.  She was asked
whether “some people were perhaps upset by the message that
was being delivered by the people with the bullhorn[.]”  (J.A. II
121.)  Her answer:  “Well, sure they were.  Sure, I mean, you
know, it was a pretty intense message, and there were people
with little kids and stuff, so yes, some of them were upset with
the message.”  (Id.)  When asked whether that reaction was part
of her concern, Byrne stated, “No, my concern was – well, it
was that, but the bullhorn, too.”  (Id.)
“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
The First Amendment’s proscription of speech13
regulation based on audience reaction has sometimes been
referred to as the “heckler’s veto.”  See Brown v. Louisiana, 383
U.S. 131, 133 n.1 (1966) (plurality opinion); see also Startzell,
533 F.3d at 200.
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expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.”  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414
(1989) (citations omitted); see also Bachellar v. Maryland, 397
U.S. 564, 567 (1970).  Thus, “in public debate our own citizens
must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to
provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by
the First Amendment.”  Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)
(plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).  These principles are well embedded in First
Amendment jurisprudence.  Together they stand for the
proposition that where the government regulates speech based
on its perception that the speech will spark fear among or disturb
its audience, such regulation is by definition based on the
speech’s content.   See Forsyth County v. Nationalist13
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992) (“Listeners’ reaction to
speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation.” (citations
omitted)); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. L.A. County
Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 789 (9th Cir. 2008); Grider v.
Abramson, 180 F.3d 739, 749 (6th Cir. 1999).  Ever vigilant
against “improper attempts to value some forms of speech over
others,” City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994)
(O’Connor, J., concurring), the Supreme Court and the courts of
appeals have consistently held unconstitutional regulations
See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 52914
U.S. 803, 811-12 (2000) (“The overriding justification for the
regulation is concern for the effect of the subject matter on [its
audience]. . . .  This is the essence of content-based
regulation.”); Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 134 (striking down
ordinance that computed parade fees based on estimated cost of
ensuring public safety because the “fee assessed . . . depend[ed]
on the administrator’s measure of the amount of hostility likely
to be created by the speech based on its content”); Johnson, 491
U.S. at 412 (finding a statute content-based because it punished
speech based on the impact of flag desecration on its audience);
Boos, 485 U.S. at 321 (plurality opinion) (explaining that “[t]he
emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a ‘secondary
effect’” and concluding that a regulation barring critical displays
in front of embassies to protect foreign diplomats was
content-based); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965)
(holding that police could not bar a civil rights protest because
of “fear of violence . . . based upon the reaction of the group of
white citizens looking on from across the street”); see also, e.g.,
Ovadal v. City of Madison, 416 F.3d 531, 533-34, 537 (7th Cir.
2005) (reversing summary judgment where Christian protestors
were threatened with arrest while displaying signs over a
highway and disturbing drivers because “[t]he police must
permit the speech and control the crowd; there is no heckler’s
veto” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Christian Knights
of Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. District of Columbia,
972 F.2d 365, 372-74 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that the District
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based on the reaction of the speaker’s audience to the content of
expressive activity.14
of Columbia’s “proposed restriction of the location of the Klan’s
march, resting as it did on the threat of listeners’ violent reaction
to the message being delivered, was content based”).
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Here, the rangers’ testimony reflects that they:  observed
that Liberty Bell visitors and pedestrians were disturbed by and
complained about Marcavage’s preaching and the graphic
images on the signs displayed by Marcavage’s group; were
concerned by visitors’ reactions to that message and those signs;
and thought it unfair that those individuals were being subjected
against their will to listening to that message and viewing those
signs.  Significantly, they testified that their decision to remove
Marcavage was a product of, among other things, those
concerns.
Marcavage testified that he travels throughout
Pennsylvania to “express the grievous situation we have in our
nation where over four thousand babies are killed at the hands
of abortionists.”  (J.A. II 305.)  He illustrated his view of the
abortion procedure:  “Their beating hearts are stopped, they are
torn limb from limb in their mother’s womb in the name of
choice.”  (Id.)  His group’s perception of the tangible aftermath
of that procedure was emblazoned on its signs for all to see; they
bore various vivid depictions of mutilated fetuses.  No matter
one’s personal feelings about abortion, the images are jarring,
their shock value unmistakable.  Presumably, that was the point.
But “[s]peech cannot be . . . punished or banned[] simply
because it might offend” its audience.  Forsyth County, 505 U.S.
at 134-35; see Brazos Valley Coalition for Life, Inc. v. City of
Bryan, 421 F.3d 314, 326 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he government
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, the15
Supreme Court held, in the context of a facial attack on an
ordinance on First Amendment grounds, that a statute was
content-neutral where the government’s “predominate” concerns
in enacting it did not relate to the content of the speech the
statute sought to regulate, even though “a motivating factor” in
enacting the statute was the suppression of a particular kind of
speech.  Id. at 47-48.  Renton’s secondary effects analysis does
not inform our inquiry, as the question before us is not what the
government’s purpose was in enacting a regulation but rather the
motivation of the rangers in this case for excluding Marcavage
from the 6th Street sidewalk.  See Presbytery of N.J. of the
Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Whitman, 99 F.3d 101, 106
(3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that “if the district court correctly
abstained from deciding appellants’ as applied challenge, its
discussion of viewpoint discrimination and the secondary effects
doctrine was unnecessary”).
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cannot restrict speech out of a concern for the discomfort it
might elicit in listeners.” (citations omitted)).  The government
in effect ratified what it perceived as listener hostility to
Marcavage’s speech when it silenced that speech.  That act,
coupled with its impetus, constitutes a content-based restriction
on speech.15
Our problem with the District Court’s content-neutrality
finding is not based just on the incongruity between the rangers’
testimony about their concerns over the impact of Marcavage’s
message and their testimony about the other reasons for their
decision to restrict Marcavage’s speech.  We also find their
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professedly exclusive motive of hazard avoidance irreconcilably
at odds with their admissions that no hazard ever materialized.
Saperstein testified that he observed many people walking along
the 6th Street sidewalk and several times described the area
around Marcavage, his co-demonstrators, and their signs as a
choke point.  (E.g., J.A. II 48, 81.)  Crane, although he was not
present during Marcavage’s demonstration, said more or less the
same thing.  (E.g., J.A. II 180.)  But importantly, neither
Saperstein nor Crane testified in any detail about what
Marcavage was specifically doing to block pedestrian traffic
despite being afforded ample opportunity to do so.  For instance,
when Marcavage’s counsel argued during Saperstein’s cross-
examination that the rangers had not “identified any public
safety issue,” (J.A. II 82), the Magistrate Judge instructed
Saperstein to be more specific.  The prosecutor then asked
Saperstein to “[t]ell us safety hazards regarding the entry and
exit to the Liberty Bell Center . . . at around the time that Mr.
Marcavage was in the area.”  (J.A. II 83.)  Saperstein responded:
There was a great amount of people in that area,
because the – because of the activities going on.
There was a large amount of people in an area
that I was trying – that I needed to keep fairly
clear in case an emergency happened.  There is
only one way in and one way out.  So, I guess if I
needed to get somebody in, there are two ways to
get in.  But, there are very, very limited access
points.
(Id.)
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That testimony, of course, hardly addresses Marcavage’s
conduct with any particularity.  Moreover, Saperstein’s own
testimony undercuts his assertion that Marcavage was creating
a choke point.  He testified, for instance, that anyone could stop
and talk on the sidewalk and that Marcavage by himself did not
block traffic.  When asked whether “everybody was able to get
passed [sic] Mr. Marcavage,” Saperstein replied, “At this point,
yeah, looking at it, there is [sic] people getting through.”  (J.A.
II 86.)  When asked whether Marcavage ever physically blocked
anyone, Saperstein said, “Not physically, no.”  (Id.)  Ranger
Trevor Belasco, who took several photographs of the 6th Street
sidewalk and surrounding area on the day of Marcavage’s
demonstration, also testified that the photographs did not show
that the demonstration in any way impeded the ability of
pedestrians to walk freely along the sidewalk or to enter or exit
the Liberty Bell Center.  (J.A. II 104, 111.)  Ranger Byrne
likewise testified that no one standing in line to enter the Liberty
Bell Center was prevented from doing so or was otherwise
blocking pedestrian traffic.  (J.A. II 120-21.)  And Chief Ranger
Crane did not answer affirmatively when asked whether
Marcavage was blocking traffic.  Instead, he stated that
Marcavage’s group “was in a location where they had signage
and were using megaphones” and that Marcavage
“[i]ndividually, by himself, I do not think that he . . . was
specifically hindering [orderly visitation at the Liberty Bell
Center].”  (J.A. II 179.)  When asked, however, whether
members of Marcavage’s group depicted in a photograph were
blocking access to the Liberty Bell Center, Crane answered
decisively in the negative.  (J.A. II 209.)
We have been very careful not to place excessive16
emphasis on the video and photographic evidence in the record,
cognizant as we are of its limitations.  The video, for example,
was shot by a member of Marcavage’s group and is therefore
refracted through that individual’s point of view.  Furthermore,
the video footage is not uninterrupted and the quality of its
sound is variable.  Similarly, because the photographs were
taken by a ranger, they are susceptible to an equal degree of one-
sidedness.  All that said, both parties have relied in no small
measure on both the video and photographs.  Because the video
and photographs are part of the record, we have seen fit to do
the same, but have not drawn any conclusions solely on the basis
of that evidence.
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The testimony of the government’s witnesses that
Marcavage’s activities might produce or were producing unsafe
conditions also directly conflicts with video and photographic
evidence that was presented at trial and is included in the record
on appeal.   The video evidence, in particular, tells a very16
different story from the one the government evoked at trial.  It
shows Marcavage holding a bullhorn, though not any signs, at
around 12:35 p.m. while standing alone on the Belgian block
portion of the 6th Street sidewalk.  There is no one either in his
immediate vicinity or trying to circumvent him.  Nor is there any
indication of a potential or an actual logjam among the
pedestrians using the 6th Street sidewalk.  In fact, the video
shows an entirely fluid procession of individuals walking in both
directions and entering the Liberty Bell Center unfettered and
without fanfare.  The video also shows that additional members
of Marcavage’s group were positioned further down the
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sidewalk – still on the Belgian block – and away from the
Liberty Bell Center entrance.  Marcavage is nowhere to be seen.
But even if he were present at that location, there is again no
indication that these demonstrators were impeding, or even
represented a threat to, pedestrian traffic.  Perhaps most
strikingly, the video reflects that several clutches of people
unaffiliated with Marcavage’s demonstration were congregated
in even greater concentrations than Marcavage’s group.  At one
point, for instance, there appear to be approximately twelve
individuals arranged in a cluster; they reach almost to what
seems to be the middle of the 6th Street sidewalk.  Further down
still and even closer to the Liberty Bell Center’s entrance is a
tour group consisting of around fifteen people, huddling
together while listening to their tour leader.  And throughout the
day there was a breast cancer awareness march involving large
numbers of individuals walking in throngs along the sidewalk,
much of the time even closer to the Liberty Bell Center’s
entrance and exit than Marcavage or his co-demonstrators.
We could go on but the point, we think, is made.  After
exhaustively reviewing the entire record and exercising our
independent judgment, we cannot accept the District Court’s
finding that the government restricted Marcavage’s speech for
content-neutral reasons, as that finding is untethered to, or
wholly at variance with, the record as a whole.  Cf. Anderson,
470 U.S. at 573-74 (appellate court may not upset factual
finding “[i]f the [trial] court’s account of the evidence is
plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety” (emphasis
supplied)).  We have not overlooked the Anderson Court’s
admonition that “[w]here there are two permissible views of the
evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly
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erroneous,” id. at 574 (citations omitted), and that “[t]his is so
even when the [trial] court’s findings do not rest on credibility
determinations, but are based instead on physical or
documentary evidence or inferences from other facts,” id.  But
there are not two permissible views of the evidence here.  Aside
from a passing mention in an unrelated context, neither the
Magistrate Judge’s nor the District Court’s opinion reflects any
consideration of either the tension between the rangers’ bald
assertions that Marcavage was creating a choke point and their
total inability to describe in any detail the existence or imminent
conception of such, or the video and photographic evidence
contradicting the rangers’ accounts.  Cf. McGuire v. Reilly, 260
F.3d 36, 45 (1st Cir. 2001) (“A [trial] court’s findings of fact
must be anchored in probative evidence.” (citations omitted));
United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 717 (1st Cir. 1992) (factual
findings “must be based on more than the trial judge’s hunch, no
matter how sound his instincts or how sagacious his judgment”).
In our view, in light of (1) the rangers’ testimony that they were
concerned about the effects of Marcavage’s speech on other
individuals on the 6th Street sidewalk; (2) the absence of any
probative evidence that Marcavage was in fact creating or risked
creating a traffic flow problem; and (3) the lack of any
indication that the rangers restricted the speech of even a single
other individual on the 6th Street sidewalk, there is only one
permissible view of the weight of the evidence:  the rangers’
actions were motivated by the content of Marcavage’s speech.
Cf. Brown, 586 F.3d at 295-96 & n.39; McTernan, 564 F.3d at
652-53; Startzell, 533 F.3d at 198-201.
E. Strict Scrutiny
Because the Magistrate Judge and the District Court17
both concluded that the government regulated Marcavage’s
speech without regard for its content, they did not consider, even
in the alternative, whether the government’s actions were
narrowly drawn to serve a compelling interest and whether its
methods were the least restrictive means of serving those
interests.  Instead, they analyzed, using the intermediate scrutiny
standard, whether the interests the government identified were
significant.  We customarily decline to consider issues not
addressed by the district court.  See, e.g., In re Montgomery
Ward & Co., 428 F.3d 154, 166 (3d Cir. 2005).  Our observance
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Because the restrictions imposed on Marcavage were
content-based, they are presumptively invalid, Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 115 (1991), and the government must meet the strict
scrutiny standard to prove their constitutionality, see Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 382 (1992).  To that end, the government’s restrictions
on Marcavage’s speech must “(1) serve a compelling
governmental interest; (2) be narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest; and (3) be the least restrictive means of advancing that
interest.”  ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted).
Evidently presuming that we would concur with the
Magistrate Judge and the District Court that the restrictions on
Marcavage’s speech were not content-based, the government
has chosen not to submit any purportedly compelling interests
to us.   It is not our practice to make a litigant’s case for it, and17
of that custom, however, is not inflexible.  We may depart from
it “where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt . . . or where
injustice might otherwise result.”  Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106, 121 (1976) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We believe that either of these exceptions is triggered here.  As
to the first exception, Marcavage has placed his argument that
his speech was restricted based on content squarely before both
the District Court and us.  The government therefore has
consistently been on notice of that argument and has had ample
opportunity to respond to and rebut it.  And, just as importantly,
we have an adequate record to make a considered determination
on that very point.  As to the second exception, Marcavage was
convicted in June 2008, or approximately two years ago.  The
weight of that conviction no doubt has taken its toll on him
during the pendency of this appeal.  The passage of time and the
importance of correcting a criminal conviction that may have
been obtained in error also counsel our resolution of this case
one way or the other.
In fact, the government’s discussion of Marcavage’s18
bullhorn use appears mostly in the context of its rebuttal to
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the government is no exception.  Cf. United States v.
Calderon-Pacheco, 564 F.3d 55, 58 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Courts
ought not to be obliged to do a litigant’s homework for him.”).
Nevertheless, we perceive two conceivable interests at stake
here:  ensuring traffic flow and/or public safety, and regulating
noise.  And, in fact, the government more or less asserted those
interests in the context of its preferred intermediate scrutiny
analysis.18
Marcavage’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim as well as its
argument that the 6th Street sidewalk is a nonpublic forum.  The
government mentions the bullhorn only fleetingly, and then only
when comparing this case to cases the government deems
analogous.  Although the government arguably waived any
reliance on its interest in regulating noise amplification given
these circumstances, see, e.g., Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 642
(3d Cir. 2009), we find its reliance on Marcavage’s bullhorn use
unavailing for other reasons addressed elsewhere.
The government also does not argue that the violations
relating to the bullhorn – interfering with ranger instructions to
people in the line and violating the orders to stop using the
bullhorn – were separate and distinct from the violations relating
to Marcavage’s refusal to vacate the sidewalk.  If the rangers’
only problem with Marcavage related to the amplification of his
speech rather than the content thereof, an order not to use a
bullhorn could be a valid time, place, and manner restriction.
The record in this case is too equivocal for us to determine
whether the orders to cease using a bullhorn constituted a
separate content-neutral regulation or were influenced by the
content-based orders to vacate the sidewalk.  Because the
government bears the burden of showing that the regulation is
content-neutral, Hill, 530 U.S. at 770, we cannot affirm the
bullhorn-related violations on this ground.
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Traffic flow is undoubtedly a legitimate government
interest, see Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519
U.S. 357, 376 (1997); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S.
753, 768 (1994), and so is noise control, see Ward, 491 U.S. at
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803; Startzell, 533 F.3d at 199 n.10.  But to say that these
interests are “legitimate,” “valid,” or “strong” is not to say that
they are necessarily “compelling.”  Indeed, the contours of
“compelling” in this context are not easily delineated.  The
Supreme Court itself has used variable formulations to define
that term.  See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (“interests of the highest
order” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“overriding state
interest”); see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 530
(1986) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“unusually important
interest”).  And in those cases in which traffic and noise control
have been identified as legitimate government interests, the
Supreme Court was applying intermediate, not strict, scrutiny,
so it concluded that those interests were merely “significant” or
“substantial” as opposed to “compelling.”  See Schenck, 519
U.S. at 369, 375-76; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 771-73; Ward, 491
U.S. at 803.
We do not necessarily reject the general proposition that
traffic and noise control may be considered compelling interests
under certain circumstances, see, e.g., Lutz v. City of York, 899
F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 1990) (assuming without deciding that
“ensuring public safety and reducing . . . noise . . . can probably
be deemed compelling”), and we will assume, for the sake of
argument, that those interests are compelling here, but see Snell
v. City of York, 564 F.3d 659, 668-69 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding
only a significant, not a compelling, interest “in promoting
traffic safety and traffic flow”).  Still, the government’s mantra-
like incantation of these interests does not on its own establish
that its restriction of Marcavage’s speech was narrowly drawn
Although the Magistrate Judge and the District Court19
both mentioned Marcavage’s use of a bullhorn, neither expressly
concluded that the government had a significant, much less a
compelling, interest in controlling noise amplification.  The
Magistrate Judge also did not explicitly find that the government
proved that Marcavage’s bullhorn use, as opposed to someone
else’s, created a disturbance.  When Marcavage pointed out that
alleged shortcoming in his challenge to the Magistrate Judge’s
ruling, the District Court was unconvinced, highlighting
testimony and photographic evidence that Marcavage was using
a bullhorn at some point during the demonstration, though the
Court did not tie that use to the actual disturbance about which
the rangers testified.
To the extent the government spotlights its interest in
regulating noise amplification generally, and Marcavage’s use
of a bullhorn specifically, to justify its actions, we are unmoved.
There is certainly record evidence that Marcavage was using a
bullhorn at different times during his demonstration.  The video,
for instance, depicts Marcavage speaking through a bullhorn at
around 12:35 p.m.  But Ranger Saperstein testified only that he
approached Marcavage at 12:10 p.m. because his “group was
using a bullhorn[.]”  (J.A. II 41 (emphasis added).)  And Ranger
Byrne testified that, at some point between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00
p.m., she asked for ranger assistance while on duty outside the
Liberty Bell Center because an individual whom she could not
identify was using a bullhorn and thereby interfering with her
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to serve those interests or that its actions were the least
restrictive means of serving those interests.   Instead, facts19
instructions to visitors.  (J.A. II 115-19.)  Finally, Chief Ranger
Crane testified that the use of a bullhorn interferes with rangers’
directions as a general matter but did not testify that
Marcavage’s use in particular was creating a disturbance.  (J.A.
II 183.)  Importantly, this testimony establishes only the
flimsiest link between Marcavage’s use of a bullhorn and any
actual interference with or disruption to the rangers’
management of the Park.  Furthermore, in the chronology of
events during the relevant time frame, the government’s
evidence shows only that Marcavage was using a bullhorn well
before 1:00 p.m. at the latest.  He was not arrested, however,
until after 2:00 p.m.  We are at a loss to understand how the
government could have had an interest “of the highest order” or
an “overriding” interest in halting Marcavage’s use of a bullhorn
when it arrested him more than one hour after he had stopped
using it.  On this record, therefore, we cannot conclude that the
government had a compelling interest in terminating
Marcavage’s expressive activity based on its decibel level.
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matter, and what may be narrowly drawn and the least restrictive
means in one case will not necessarily be so in another.  See
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530
U.S. 567, 584 (2000); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 228 (1995); McTernan, 564 F.3d at 650-51.  The
government’s exclusion of Marcavage from the 6th Street
sidewalk cannot withstand strict scrutiny because, for
interrelated reasons, that exclusion was neither narrowly tailored
to serve the government’s interests nor the least restrictive
means of doing so.  The government’s assertion of compelling
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interests is just that:  a bare recital unmoored from the specific
circumstances of this case.  Cf. Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune
Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1267 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
government’s “proffered interests in aesthetics or traffic safety”
where the ordinance “recites those interests only at the highest
order of abstraction, without ever explaining how they are
served by the sign code’s regulations generally”).
To pass the narrow-tailoring part of the test, the
government must demonstrate that its regulation of Marcavage’s
speech did “not ‘burden substantially more speech than is
necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.’”
Ben Rich Trading, Inc. v. City of Vineland, 126 F.3d 155, 163
(3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).  The
government has fallen short of that mark.  The government does
not tell us with any convincing degree of specificity, and the
trial testimony does not reflect, how the regulation of
Marcavage’s speech served its asserted interests.  The rangers
testified that Marcavage endangered public safety because he
was standing directly outside the Liberty Bell Center’s entrance
and exit.  Even accepting that testimony at face value – which,
for the reasons we have already discussed, we cannot do – the
government has made no showing that the rangers’ order that
Marcavage decamp to Market Street or the other side of the
Liberty Bell Center was narrowly drawn to serve its interest in
ensuring public safety when:  a mass of visitors was queued up
along the wall outside the Liberty Bell Center, even closer to the
entrance than Marcavage or any of his co-demonstrators; a
procession of breast cancer awareness marchers, whose numbers
far exceeded those in Marcavage’s group, was moving slowly
along the sidewalk; horse-drawn carriages were lined up all
As far as we can tell, the sole distinction the20
government has attempted to draw between Marcavage and
anyone else on the 6th Street sidewalk is predicated on
Marcavage’s election to stand still while others were on the go.
That distinction is plagued by crucial weaknesses.  Most
importantly, it is not borne out by the record.  As we have
explained, tour groups and others also put down stakes at
various times and at various locations along the sidewalk,
including near where Marcavage was standing.  The record just
does not support a finding that Marcavage was uniquely
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along the curb, ready to cart tourists off for a joy ride; and
countless other people were going about their business in sundry
ways.  All this goes to show the absence of any probative
evidence in the record that these other individuals represented
a lesser threat to traffic flow or public safety than Marcavage
did.  “Underinclusive enforcement of a law suggests that the
government’s ‘supposedly vital interest’ is not really
compelling, and can also show that the law is not narrowly
tailored.”  United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 958 (10th Cir.
2008) (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546-47); see also
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002)
(“[A] law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the
highest order . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that
supposedly vital interest unprohibited.” (first alteration in
original and quotation marks and citation omitted)); Gilleo, 512
U.S. at 52 (“Exemptions from an otherwise legitimate regulation
of a medium of speech . . . may diminish the credibility of the
government’s rationale for restricting speech in the first place.”
(citation omitted)).20
stationary or that, if he was, he was hindering traffic flow.  And
the government has not adduced any evidence that Marcavage’s
presence at the precise location where he had positioned himself
posed a risk to passers-by or that his chosen location, in
conjunction with the specific physical features of the 6th Street
sidewalk, created such a risk.
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Similarly, ordering – and then effectuating by force –
Marcavage’s wholesale removal from the 6th Street sidewalk
fails the least-restrictive-means test because there were other
ways the government could have attained its objectives that
would have been “at least as effective.”  Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 874 (1997).  The choice presented to Marcavage was
rather stark:  he could either desist entirely or demonstrate
elsewhere.  Common sense alone belies the necessity of such a
black-and-white approach, but so does the record.  Ranger
Saperstein told Marcavage that he and his co-demonstrators
could not stand anywhere on the 6th Street sidewalk.  But if the
government’s concern had truly been limited to maintaining
order and ensuring safe conditions around the Liberty Bell
Center’s entrance and exit, there is no reason why the rangers
could not have given Marcavage the option of moving a short
ways up or down the block.  They did not do so.
Chief Ranger Crane’s testimony likewise blunts the force
of any claim that the government availed itself of the least
restrictive means.  Crane testified that Marcavage could have
carried on with his demonstration, signs and all, if he had simply
walked up and down the 6th Street sidewalk instead of standing
still.  That testimony dovetails with Saperstein’s that an
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individual could amble to and fro along the sidewalk doing
whatever he pleased without obtaining permission.  But there is
no indication here that the rangers entertained this option or
shared it with Marcavage.  The availability of these alternatives
– and there were surely others – destroys any claim that the
government’s tack was the least restrictive means of ensuring
public safety.  See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 816 (“When a plausible,
less restrictive alternative is offered to a content-based speech
restriction, it is the Government’s obligation to prove that the
alternative will be ineffective to achieve its goals.”); 44
Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 530 (1996)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The ready
availability of . . . alternatives – at least some of which would
far more effectively achieve [the state’s] only professed goal . . .
– demonstrates that the fit between ends and means is not
narrowly tailored.”); see also, e.g., Burk v. Augusta-Richmond
County, 365 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is clear that
regulating as few as five peaceful protestors (e.g. silently sitting
in on the edge of the sidewalk) is not the least restrictive means
of accomplishing the County’s legitimate traffic flow and
peace-keeping concerns.” (footnote omitted)).
Having been presented with Marcavage’s First
Amendment challenge, the government shouldered the burden
of establishing that its regulation of his speech was
constitutional.  See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 816.  The government
sought to meet that burden by arguing in only generic terms that
Marcavage represented a threat to public safety.  But the
government was too sure of its position.  Taking refuge behind
the District Court’s factual findings and credibility
determinations, the government glossed over Marcavage’s belief
51
that the restrictions on his speech were content-based.  In so
doing, the government failed to establish that those restrictions
were both narrowly drawn to serve a compelling interest and the
least restrictive means of serving that interest; it was not
foreclosed from hedging its bets yet it simply elected not to do
so.  The government failed to carry its burden of proving that its
content-based regulation of Marcavage’s speech survives strict
scrutiny.  Accordingly, we hold that the government
impermissibly infringed Marcavage’s First Amendment right to
free speech.
IV.
The record in this case leaves us with the firm conviction
that the Park rangers on the whole treated Marcavage and his
group with courtesy and respect and comported themselves with
no small amount of restraint and patience.  And we are not
insensitive to the rangers’ laudable efforts to ensure the smooth
operation of a national park located in the middle of a major
metropolis – assuredly no easy undertaking, especially on a busy
Saturday when hordes of pedestrians are idling about, hustling
by, or seeking entry to historic landmarks.  But while
maintenance of the public order is a legitimate objective, its
pursuit does not license the government to deprive an individual
of a constitutional right irrespective of the circumstances.  To
conclude otherwise would permit the government to cast off the
First Amendment’s protective cloak with no more than a
scripted invocation of amorphous interests.  Our First
Amendment jurisprudence requires a far more nuanced approach
designed to strike the right balance between competing interests.
On this record, we are persuaded that the scale tips in
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Marcavage’s favor.  Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons,
we will vacate his conviction.
